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seems to be a question over which reasonable men might differ and
21
rightly a question for the jury.
DONALD LEON MOORE

Torts-Libel in Will-Publication-Liability of Estate
Where a testator left ten dollars to his grandson and in the will
accused him of squandering one thousand dollars, of deserting his
mother and the testator by taking sides against him in a lawsuit, and of
shirking his duty in World War II, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that "an action will lie against the testator's estate for libelous matter
contained in a will published after the death of the testator."' This
decision, because of its rather clear logic, should help to swing the balance toward some degree of certainty in a field which, at the present
time, shows little uniformity of result. There are three other decisions
in this country in which the same result was reached as in the instant
case 2 and three in which liability was denied.3
Two of the cases denying recovery do so on the theory that the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cur persona applies in these
21 In affirming the granting of the motion for non suit, the court felt that the
evidence was so clear that no other reasonable inference was deducible. Donlop v.
Snyder, 234 N. C. 627, 630, 68 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1951). Cf., Cox v. Railroad, 123
N. C. 604, 607, 31 S. E. 848, 850 (1898): "The plaintiff's evidence must . . .be
accepted as true, and construed in the light most favorable for him. . . . It is
well settled that if there is more than a scintilla of evidence tending to prove the
plaintiff's contention, it must be submitted to the jury, who alone can pass upon
the weight of the evidence." See also: Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S. W.
2d 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942): "The test of whether one on premises used
for public purposes is an invitee at the exact place of injury seems to be whether
the owner of the premises ought to have anticipated the member of the public at
this point on the premises devoted to public use. It is not essential that the owner
should have foreseen the precise injury to any particular individual, but merely
that some like injury might, and probably would, result to someone lawfully on
the premises.... The duty to keep premises safe for invitees does not necessarily
apply to the entire premises. It extends to all portions of the premises which are
included within the invitation, and which are necessary or convenient for the invitee
to use in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended, and at
which his presence should therefore reasonably be anticipated, or which he is
allowed to go." See, e.g., Heller v. Select Lake City Operating Co., 187 F. 2d
649 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Mulford v. Hotel Co., 213 N. C. 603, 197 S. E. 169 (1938) ;
Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, 37 S. W. 2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).

v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 690 (Ore. 1954).
Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; In Matter
of Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913).
'Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313
(1933), reversing Hendricks v. Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App.
408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931); Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487 (1934);
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. 2d 814 (1948). The Nagle case would
seem to overrule the decision allowing recovery in Gallagher's Estate, supra note
2, not by repudiating the basic theory of the lower court but by carrying the case
into the field of privilege.
1Kleinschmidt

2
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situations,4 but those finding liability hold that since the publication
complained of occurs after the testator's death, the right of action does
not arise until after his death, and, therefore, could not have expired
at the time the testator died, as contemplated by the maxim. 5 But, the
finding that the maxim does not apply does not end the question, for
there are other problems which must be considered before the estate can
be held liable.
The question of whether the executor is the agent of the testator
sometimes causes trouble. The Oregon court held in the principal case
that there was no agency relationship before the death of the testator
between the testator and the executor and that, consequently, in offering
the will for probate the executor could not be acting as the agent of the
testator." Even under the agency theory different results are possible.
The Tennessee court holds that the executor is the agent of the testator
and the estate should be held liable,7 while the South Carolina court,
applying the rule that "agency terminates upon the death of the principal," holds that the estate is not liable.8
The best reasoning seems to be that of the Oregon court, which says
that the person publishing the will "is an instrumentality through which
the will is published, and when he does thus act he in effect publishes the
' Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, supra note 3; Carver v.
Morrow, supra note 3.
Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686 (Ore. 1954) ; In Matter of Gallagher's
Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733, 736 (Orphan's Ct. 1901): "No right of action existed
for the wrong alleged to have been done this claimant when Father Gallagher died;
for the will had not and could not have been published, and was, therefore, obviously
not within the letter of the rule."; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
580, 162 S. W. 584, 586 (1913) : "So the tort upon which this suit is based was not
committed, until after the death of Woodfin. This right of action arose after Woodfin's death, and could not have been buried with him. The case therefore falls
without the letter of the old rule."
But see Note, Right of Recovery for Testamentary Libel, 27 HARv. L. Rxv. 666,
668 (1914), where the proposition is put forth that "if no tort is committed till
after death, there is then no tortfeasor to punish"-a legalistic bit of thought
which contemplates putting an end to the matter without contributing too much
to a sound analysis of the problem. See also Hegel v. George, 218 Wis. 327, 259
N. W. 862, 864 (1935), for an example of the type of case in which the logic used
in the principal case is employed to deny recovery in a wrongful death action.
Howe, plaintiff's intestate, was the driver of a car involved in a collision with a
car driven by George. George died a few hours before Howe. George was found
negligent. The statute declared that "actions for wrongful death survive the death
of the wrongdoer." The court held that, since the death of the wrongdoer preceded
the death of the plaintiff-decedent, "there was and is no cause of action." A similar case is Martinelli v. Burke, 298 Mass. 390, 10 N. E. 2d (1937) ; this case is the
subject of annotation in 112 A. L. R. 341 (1938).
' Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, supra note 5.
'Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578-9, 162 S. W. 584, 585-6
(1913) : "It is well settled that a principal is responsible when authority is given
to an agent to publish libelous words and a publication is made by the agent in
substantial accord with his authority ...
The publication of this libel was made
by the agent, the executor.... if liability exists the principal should be responsible."
' Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 204, 48 S. E. 2d 814, 817 (1948). That this
is the prevalent doctrine in agency law can hardly be contested. RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 120 (1933).
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will at the behest of the testator."
Indeed it is difficult to see that a
strict agency theory is necessary, for one who is the author of libelous
material and places it in such circumstances that publication will necessarily result, is liable for the eventual publication."0 Thus there will
be publication of the libel in the will, not only by filing the will for probate, but also during the probate proceedings, and after probate when
the will is on file as a public record. "No more effective means of publishing and perpetuating a libel can be conceived than to secure the
inscription of such matter in court records, as by probate of a will.""1
When one executes a will he does so with the knowledge and expectation
that such will is to be published after his death; this is the natural course
of events, and at any rate it is probably the common law duty of one in
possession of a will to file it with the proper court after the death of the
testator. 12 Further, many states by statute have made provisions to
force one having possession of a will to present the same for probate.' 3
The better reasoning would therefore seem to be that the testator, and
not the person who physically publishes the will, is the party responsible
for the publication.
Having established that there was no agency, the court in the instant
case then reasoned that the executor "is not an officer or agent of the
court until he is appointed and letters testamentary issued to him" ;14
therefore, there is a "hiatus between the testator's death and the court
appointment of the executor," and when the executor "or the custodian
of the will, files the same with the clerk, he is not acting for the court
but necessarily for the deceased. .

. ."
In this manner the court comKleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 689 (Ore. 1954).
1" Some examples are: (1) sending libelous matter to a blind person, Lane v.
Schilling, 130 Ore. 119, 279 Pac. 267 (1929) ; (2) sending letter to fourteen-yearold boy accusing him of theft, Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517
(1922) ; (3) sending libelous matter with good reason to believe that it -will be

opened by authorized person other than addressee, Riley v. Askin and Marine Co.,
134 S. C. 198, 132 S. E. 584 (1926) ; (4) sending letter to known illiterate, Wilcox
v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, 24 Atl. 244 (1892) ; Allen v. Worthan, 89 Ky. 485, 13 S. W.
73 (1890).
" Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578, 162 S. E. 584, 585 (1913).
122 PAGE, WILLS § 585 (3rd ed. 1941).
1" E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-15 (1950).
See also 2 PAGE, WILLS § 586 (3rd ed.
1941).
" Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 688 (Ore. 1954); Cf. Lindley v.
United States, 59 F. 2d 336 (9th Cir. 1932) ; Fistel v. Beaver Trust Co., 94 F.
Supp. 974 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) ; In re Estate of Doefler, 348 IIl. App. 347, 109 N. E.
230 (1952) ; Davenport v. Sandeman, 204 Iowa 927, 216 N. W. 55 (1927) ; In re
Ballard's Estate, 362 Mo. 1150, 247 S. W. 2d 683 (1952) ; In re Garris's Estate,
46 A. 2d 76 (Orphan's Ct. N. J. 1946) ; Dodd v. Anderson, 179 N. Y. 466, 90 N. E.
1137 (1910). But at common law the executor derived his authority from the will
and did not have to wait for probate. Grant v. Spann, 34 Miss. 294 (1857) ; State
v. Tazewell, 132 Ore. 122, 283 Pac. 745 (1930). See Harris v. Citizens' Bank and
Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200 S. E. 652 (1939).
15 Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 688 (Ore. 1954).
It would also
appear to this writer that there should be ample opportunity for a libelous publication other than by the filing of the will for probate, since it seems quite likely that
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pletely renders irrelevant the matter of whether the probate was a pleading in a court action and therefore privileged.
The instant case held that the publication "is not privileged because
publication antedates the probation.' 6 If, however, it is held that the
mere filing of the will with the probate court is a part of the judicial
proceeding, then the question of privilege becomes a much more difficult
problem, for when this reasoning is used the publication is frequently
held to be privileged on the ground that it is much the same as a party's
pleading in a civil action. 17 One answer to such an argument is that,
even though this may be a pleading, it is not privileged because the injured party cannot answer in a statement that will be included in the
record. 18 It should be noted that the matter must be relevant for this
privilege to apply.' 9
One method of providing a partial answer to the problem has been
to allow the petitioner for probate to call possible libelous passages to
the court's attention and to petition for their omission from the will.
This procedure has been allowed in a few New York and English cases
where the matter omitted from the will was not material to the disposition of the property. 20 Such a procedure is of questionable value, 21 for
someone other than the libeled party will read the will prior to the probate thereof
and such communication, even to one person, would constitute publication. Simms
v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. Ct. App. 1946) ; Josa v. Maroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So.
908 (1910) ; Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S.E. 517 (1922) ; Ostrowe
v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931) ; Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. 442, 7
N . Y. S. 2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200
F. 2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U. S.940 (1953).
" Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 689 (Ore. 1954).
1 It has been held that the filing of a will for probate is clearly analogous to a
plaintiff's pleading in a civil action in that it is the beginning of a judicial proceeding. "We believe that the rule which makes the pleading in a judicial proceeding absolutely privileged may properly be applied to a will in which there is no
apparent purpose to injure the reputation of any one but merely a purpose to insure
distribution of the testator's estate to his intended beneficiaries and to protect it

from possible claims of persons whom he does not desire to share in the distribution." Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 510, 175 Atl. 487, 488 (1934).
"' In re Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733, 737 (Orphan's Ct. 1900). It would
appear that the view of the Gallagher case is not without merit, but the value of
this particular part of the opinion as a precedent is doubtful, for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that such a filing is part of the judicial proceeding and

is privileged. Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934). However, a
lower court of New York seems to approve of the language used in the Gallagher
case. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
"0North Carolina has held that pleadings are privileged when pertinent and
relevant even if false and malicious, but where the defamatory matter is not relevant the party is stripped of the privilege. Harshaw v. Harshaw, 220 N. C. 145,
16 S.E. 2d 666 (1941). This view is also adopted in Scott v. Statesville Plywood
and Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S.E. 2d 146 (1954) ; PRossm, ToRTs § 94 (1941).
See also Note 48 HARV. L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1935) for a discussion in which the
writer concludes: "although redress should be allowed where libelous material is
irrelevant and engendered by malice, recovery should be limited to compensatory
damages since it is the estate rather than the guilty testator which must suffer."
"0It re Draske's Will, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N. Y. S.581 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; In re
Payne's Estate, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N. Y. S.407 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; It re Speiden's
Estate, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N. Y. S.223 (Surr. Ct. 1926) ; In re Bomar's Will, 27
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a publication occurs between the time the will is offered for probate and
the decision is reached as to what portions should be omitted. Therefore, the harm is done even though the libelous portions are stricken from
the will.22 Where the libelous material is omitted, the determination of
what is actually dispositive must be liberally made in order to guard
against the omission of possible explanations as to the reasons for the
disposition of the property. The omitted matter may prove to be of
23
value if the will is contested.
There does not seem to be a North Carolina case dealing with libel
by will. This naturally poses the question as to what action the North
Carolina courts will take when faced with this situation. North Carolina
General Statute § 28-175 provides in part: "The following rights of
action do not survive: 1. Causes of action for libel and slander." It
would seem that the same reasoning would apply to this statute as the
courts have applied to the common law maxim that a personal right of
action dies with the person, and that it should be held that the statute
24
does not apply to the fact situation that exists in the principal case.
However, this would still leave the court free to decide the case either
for or against allowing the action to be brought, and a combination of
the reasons given in the decided cases could be used to allow or deny
recovery. It would seem that even if the court ignored the fact that the
libeled party may not answer and considered the probate of the will as
a pleading in a civil case (and consequently privileged) there would still
Abb. N. C. 425, 44 N. Y. S. R. 304, 18 N. Y. S.214 (Ct. Com. P1. 1892) ; In the

Estate of Caie, 43 T. L. R. 697 (1927) ; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Swa. and Tr. 528, 164
Eng.
Rep. 845 (1860).
21
This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached by the author of a

note in 10 N. C. L. RaV. 88, 90 (1931), which was written on the case of Hendricks

v. Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S.E. 915 (1931), reed,
Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933).
There the author states: "In view of the American holdings it seems desirable for
the legislature to give to the probate court authority to expunge from a will libelous
matter which is not strictly dispositive."
2 See Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910, 922 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
where the court discusses the probable value of a petition for expungement at the
time the will was presented for probate and concludes that even if the matter were
expunged there would only have been "a reduction in the extent of the publication
of the libel; it would not have prevented the publication." See also 4 PAGE, WILLS
§ 1768 (3d ed. 1941).
2 But in some cases the expungement is from the probate copies only, and it
would seem that some of the disadvantages of expungement are avoided in this manner. Inre Croker's Will, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 190 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In the Estate of
Heywood, [1916] P. 47; In the Estate of White, [1914] P. 153; In re Goods of
Wartuaby, 1 Rob. Ecc. 423, 163 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1846).
But see the following where expungement was denied on the grounds: (1) that
the testator's wishes as to publication must be allowed, Hagen v. Yates, 1 Dem.
584 (N. Y. Surr. 1893); (2) that the court did not have the authority to order
expungement, Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Add. Ecc. 33, 162 Eng. Rep. 33 (1825).

" One must keep in mind that a holding by the court that the party has a cause
of action does not settle the question, for the defendant still has the defense of
truth. Hamilton v. Nance, 159 N. C. 56, 74 S.E. 627 (1912) ; PaOSSER, ToaTs § 95
(1941).
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be cases, at least where the matter is clearly irrelevant, in which the
25
plaintiff should be allowed to prosecute his case.
The result reached in the principal case seems to be more in line
with modem concepts of justice than does the proposition that one may
defame his fellow man and escape liability for the act. It is true that
it is the heirs who must suffer because of his indiscretion, since the estate
must pay the judgment, but this fact alone will exert a strong influence
on the maker of a will and cause him to be a bit more careful of the
26
reputations of those who might survive him.
JOSEPii F. TURNER, JR.
It is suggested that the legislature should amend the present statute so as to
specifically provide recovery for libelous material in a will, particularly where this
material is not relevant.
2' Some of the reasons advanced for allowing recovery are: that the testator

composed the" libel and selected a means of publication that was almost certain to
attain the desired results, Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); the alleged libel is written with premeditation and the writer intends
to escape liability by a publication of the item when he will not be subject to an

action and further with the knowledge that the libel will be a part of a public

record to be a "perpetual reminder of the charge," In Matter of Gallagher's Estate,

10 Pa. Dist. 733, 736 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; "If relief be denied this plaintiff in this

suit, she is indeed in a bad plight. There is no other way in which she may vindi-

cate the virtue and integrity of her mother and establish for herself the position
in society which she is entitled to occupy. .

.

. It cannot be said that the law

affords no remedy for a wrong such as the one perpetuated by this testator."
Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 585, 162 S. W. 584, 587 (1913).

